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War on Drugs:
by Joseph Miranda
for further reading: A recent tragedy in Texas demonstrates how dangerous a military buildup can be to civilians. The Drug Policy Forum of Texas provides this story on the shooting of Esequiel Hernandez by a U.S. Marine and general information on the militarization of the drug war.
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Exercise in FutilitySince at least the mid 1980s, the use of the United States armed forces in the "war on drugs" has been a topic of much debate. The term 'war' is evoked and ambitious objectives declared, justifying the participation on an increasing level of armed forces in counterdrug operations both domestically and internationally.To many Americans, frustrated by the apparent lack of progress in the control of the illegal drug trade, the use of the armed forces seems a logical step. The military, drug warriors argue, can bring additional manpower, resources and experience to the struggle against drugs. Despite the commitment of the armed forces, however, the United States is no closer to its goal of being "drug free" today than it was a decade ago. As will be seen, the stated objectives, with their contingent use of the armed forces, has had no basis in viable military strategy. The end result has been a drug war which has been not only demonstrably a failure but has proven counterproductive to the interests of America's national security and liberties. details of the war on drugsThe U.S. government's stated objectives in the war on drugs can be summarized as follows:
In the name of these objectives, the United States has seen a gradual insertion of its armed forces into the war on drugs since the 1980s. As an example, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 gives the Department of Defense responsibility for certain aspects of drug enforcement, including Detection and Monitoring (D&M)and C3I ("command-control-communications-intelligence", a military term for the integration of the various procedures for commanding operations). This Act also authorizes the use of the National Guard in drug enforcement. Title 10 US Code, chapter 18, gives guidance for the use of the armed forces in law enforcement. The armed forces are prohibited from direct search, seizure and arrest, unless authorized by law. Joint Counterdrug Operations (Joint Publication 3-07.4, 9 August 1994, published by the Department of Defense) states that the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the use of the military for civilian law enforcement, does not apply to the National Guard in state service. The issue of state service is somewhat clouded by the fact that drug enforcement may be a federal mission, and that federal funds are used extensively to support the National Guard. Authorization for use of federal military forces in drug enforcement comes from Title 32 US Code, which effectively frees the armed forces from some of the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act. The armed forces have been made responsible for supporting law enforcement operations within the United States. This support includes virtually everything short of actual search, seizure and arrest. Missions include:
This sort of change represent a radical break with past practice, where the military was used for law enforcement only in emergency situations. We are taking war time measures, but is it actually a war we are waging? First, a look at the objectives. declaration vs. realityThe stated objectives are in fact totally unrealistic. It must be emphasized that the problem is not lack of effort. These objectives are flawed because they are not in accordance the nature of the drug trade in particular and war itself. This section will concentrate on an analysis of the second objective, drug interdiction, as it is the easiest to demonstrate its total removal from any connection to real world military factors. Nowhere in prohibition advocates' literature can one find a realistic analysis of the armed forces required to successfully interdict drug trafficking. The reason such an analysis cannot be found is quite simple: the mission itself is impossible. Drug warriors do not wish to acknowledge that their "war" cannot be won. Let us look at the military factors of space, time and manpower. The United States Department of Defense has actually performed an analysis of the military force it would take to secure U.S. borders against drug trafficking (i.e., to complete the interdiction mission). This analysis was reported to the United States Congress in the 1987 Review of International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. The actual force necessary included the following:
An infantry battalion is equivalent to 500-1000 men (depending upon the type). In order for a battalion to function in the field, it requires several echelons of support (everyone from intelligence to logistics units), which increases the total commitment of personnel by several times. Similarly, a helicopter company might have 15-30 aircraft, and 200 or so people. But it also requires several more echelons of support personnel to conduct sustained operations. The end result is that the above listed force would require at least 500,000 or so personnel to function in the field. Anything less than the above stated force would be a waste of resources inasmuch as drug traffickers would exploit any gaps in the border "defenses". What are the actual numbers of U.S. military personnel involved in drug interdiction? This varies depending on missions, time of year and need to impress Congressional committees. The U.S. SOUTHCOM (Southern Command), which is responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean, is considered to be manning the "front line" of the war on drugs. SOUTHCOM has a total of 6300 Army personnel, including one infantry brigade (about three battalions), plus assorted special forces, military police, military intelligence and aviation units. Within the United States itself, there were about 8000 active duty and reserve military members involved in drug enforcement missions in 1995. These totals are equal to about 6 battalions. (SOUTHCOM personnel also have military missions other than drug interdiction, so the numbers are actually somewhat less.) The Border Patrol and Customs can contribute several thousand more personnel to the borders, as well as the 300-400 DEA agents and other Department of Justice personnel involved in drug interdiction abroad. Including both military and civilian law enforcement personnel committed to interdiction, it can be seen that the total force is equal to, at best, 12 battalions. This is a mere 1/8 of the 96 battalions called for by the Department of Defense. This quick analysis demonstrates the following:
But could the United States actually seal its borders by redeploying more of its armed forces to interdiction missions? Actual United States active armed forces for 1996 include the following forces:
As can be seen, the U.S. could seal its southern borders if it were willing to pull back all of its armed forces from its global commitments and line them up along its southern border. (Incidentally, the above estimate is very loose, as it does not account for various non-divisional formations, equipment which is inoperable due to maintenance, etc.). These numbers are, in any event, far in excess of anything that the United States government or any drug war proponents seriously advocate using. And while redeploying the entire U.S. military to drug interdiction may seal the borders, it would not even begin to fulfill other missions required in the war on drugs. For example, demand would probably shift to drugs which could be manufactured domestically. Similarly, this estimate does not account for the troops needed to occupy all drug producing regions worldwide. And a redeployment of the military for total drug interdiction does not even begin to explain what will happen to the numerous other missions that the United States is currently engaged in worldwide. The United States would have to withdraw from all of its foreign treaty obligations, would be unable to provide troops for contingencies abroad, and, for that matter, would be unable to provide for defense against non-drug threats to the continental United States. As we see then, to simply carry out the objective of drug interdiction, the United States would have to effectively double the size of its current armed forces. This would require a massive expenditure of public funds and a massive mobilization of manpower. To finance such a campaign, the United States would have to increase taxes or engage in deficit spending, yet the leaders of both major political parties have continually stated their goals as the reduction of taxes and balancing the budget. The United States would also have to retool its industries to provide the equipment needed for this force. And it would have to find the manpower, the latter quite probably requiring conscription. One alternative might be to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves. The National Guard and Reserves have a combined total of approximately 30 divisional sized units, but many of these are training and cadre formations which could not be deployed unless they were filled out with conscripts. So it's back to the manpower problem, again. Even if there were a mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves, it would only shift the problem of funding and manpower around. Since the National Guard and Reserves are made up largely of part time citizen-soldiers, any mobilization would dislocate the American economy as service members were pulled out of their civilian jobs. And there also would be the economic dislocation generated by sealing the border itself, caused by the disruption of commerce and tourist traffic, as well as the fact that much of the economy of the border states depends upon cheap labor provided by undocumented immigrants. There are also the political problems. Committing National Guard units to border defense would mean pulling them out of their own states on full time federal missions. Would citizens be willing to put up with this? Any sealing of the borders could not be a temporary measure. It would have to be maintained in perpetuity, otherwise the moment the troops were pulled back, trafficking would resume. Indeed, trafficking would probably resume at a greater intensity inasmuch as the traffickers would have become more "combat-wise" by their experience in infiltrating a heavily defended border. So far this analysis has presumed that the numbers presented by the Department of Defense would be adequate to close the borders. But let us do a closer analysis. Any border defense would have to be conducted on land, sea and air, since these are all used as smuggling routes. The United States southern border, from Baja California to the mouth of the Rio Grande, is approximately 2500 kilometers in length (accounting for various convolutions in the frontier). The basic combined arms maneuver unit for the armed forces is the division. A U.S. division, depending upon the type (infantry, armored, mechanized infantry, airborne, air assault [the later being helicopter mobile]), will average 15,000-20,000 personnel, plus equipment. A division is divided into 10 or so combat maneuver battalions (infantry, amour, mechanized infantry, reconnaissance), 1 or more helicopter battalions, 4 artillery battalions, plus combat support units (engineer, signal, military police, military police), and combat service support units (supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, administrative). Infantry, reconnaissance and helicopter units would be useful for border patrol duties. Many of the other units within the divisions would be unable to properly conduct border surveillance operations. Artillery and armor would be of limited utility, although, obviously, their personnel could be converted to other functions. Also useful for border control would be non-divisional military police brigades and special operations units. A division can hold a front of up to 10 kilometers. Given that the "enemy" does not possess overwhelming firepower (at least not yet), these frontages can be extended. There is also the fact that much of the southwestern U.S. consists of "dead zones" with little population and can be thinly held. Even so, there are limits to things like the range of ground surveillance radar and patrol areas. Moreover, troops would have to be rotated out of the line for training, leave, and overhaul of equipment. Given this, perhaps the frontage of each division can be extended to 50 kilometers (which means that each maneuver battalion would have to cover about 5 kilometers). Some quick mathematics show that it would require at least 50 divisions to properly man the borders. Assuming 10 maneuver battalions per division, this comes to 500 battalions, this shows that, if anything, the 96 battalions the Department of Defense believes is the minimal requirement for interdiction is a gross underestimate. And this estimate does not take into account that the Gulf Coast would also have to be covered by a screen of troops to back up aerial and naval interdiction, although this could be held more thinly. We are left with a total armed forces in excess of six times the current size. A critical point here is that unlike a conflict like Desert Storm, firepower cannot be substituted for manpower. Controlling borders requires large numbers of troops on the ground (i.e., infantry) which means that the current hi-tech approach of the American military would have to be abandoned. (Often, Americans do not really understand the size of their own country. As an example, look at any world map and compare the U.S.-Mexican border with, say, the size of Vietnam. The U.S. and its allies could not prevent Communist infiltration into South Vietnam with a force of some 30 or so divisions during the late 1960s, plus the backing of the most extensive aerial interdiction and sensor campaigns to that date in history. If the point is made that this was because the Communists had sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, it only emphasizes the impossibility of the task. The sanctuaries for drug traffickers consist of much of the third world which is clearly far beyond the capability of the United States to occupy.) One factor contributing to the need for more troops is that the front is not limited to a line running along the U.S.-Mexican/Caribbean border itself. There would have to be depth to the positions to deal with infiltrators who make it through the border. Usual military practice is for every two units on the front line, there must be one in reserve. This increases the number of battalions needed by 50%. So now we're up to 75 divisions. And the U.S. would inevitably have to maintain troops on the southern side of the border in Mexico, throughout the Caribbean, in Central America and in the northern littoral of South America to act as advance reconnaissance forces. So this might add another increment of divisions. Moreover, much drug trafficking takes place via smuggling in commercial airliners and shipping. Virtually every international airport and port becomes a front, which would then have to be "defended." As this analysis demonstrates, the absurdity of using the military to seal the borders is self-evident. Sealing the border would mean, in effect, the creation of a militarized zone along the entire southern United States and with that, the acceleration of hostilities with Latin America. Do the proponents of interdiction seriously advocate the paying of these economic, political and military costs required to accomplish the interdiction mission? Or is the "war" metaphor simply a public relations trick to make the public believe that something is being done? Of course, America's military leaders do understand how wars are fought and won. Consequently, they have refused to drag the armed forces into what will prove to be a disastrous situation. For example, a U.S. invasion of Latin America to attack the drug cartels would prove unfeasible on numerous different fronts. In the first place, the area to be occupied is equivalent to half the continental United States. The armed forces do not exist that could occupy such a region. An American military intervention would be seen as Yankee Imperialism gone mad and be met with endless guerrilla warfare. Moreover, even if somehow various resistance forces could be beaten down, the U.S. would have to continue to occupy the Andes (and other drug producing regions) forever in order to prevent a resurgence of the drug trade. An endless war in Latin America would surely cause a political collapse at home in the United States. Now, if the proponents of a war on drugs want such a war, then they should be honest about it and go public with their demands. They can advocate the taxes and conscription to support a real war. And they can be honest with the public, as well as themselves, about the human costs this will entail. Yet they have not done so. The reason is that any politician who advocated a real war on drugs would commit political suicide. The mood of the country is such that increased taxation and a return to conscription would lead to mass protest and the electoral defeat of the politicians who started the war. And, indeed, the public might even question the entire concept of a "war" on drugs. If any drug war advocate feels this assessment is inadequate, they are requested to provide an alternative military analysis demonstrating what forces would be required to "win" the war on drugs. |
Sourcesbooks
magazine articles
government documents
internet sites
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Joseph Miranda is a former instructor at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and the Editor of Strategy and Tactics magazine. He can be reached at [email protected]. |
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